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The Weight of a Term
“substantial evidence” and buried data
Stewart Justman
ABSTRACT When Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 
1962 to ensure the efficacy of drugs before they reach the market, it imposed a standard 
of evidence distinctly weaker than the reasonable one of preponderance. The differ-
ence is material. Some drugs now on the market may or may not have a preponderance 
of trial evidence of efficacy. An obstacle to a finding of efficacy is the well-known 
nemesis of drug makers with a definite interest in favorable trials: the placebo effect. 
Trials where the placebo effect runs high are vulnerable to negative findings, and trials 
with such findings all too often find their way to burial sites like regulatory archives. 
Publication bias—the preferential reporting of positive findings—has been abetted by 
a regulatory standard that does not require a preponderance of evidence and discounts 
negative trials, provided only that two trials show positive results.
It’s common knowledge that published medical findings tell only part of the story, the other part consisting of unpublished records of negative trials, some-
times of the same agents. No one, of course, knows precisely how much lies be-
low the waterline, but informed estimates suggest that as many as half of all trials 
undertaken remain unreported (Ioannidis 2017)—a percentage sufficient to cast a 
shadow over the entire corpus of published medical research. The effect is incal-
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culable. That negative findings of trials of cancer chemotherapies would be with-
held from publication seems inconceivable, but a paper documented that practice, 
and its slanting effect on the published literature, some 30 years ago (Simes 1986). 
Severe enough to distort the medical literature and stubborn enough to persist 
for decades after exposure, the problem of the selective publication of positive 
findings—publication bias—must have deep roots. The favored explanation of 
publication bias is the heavy influence of corporate funders of clinical trials that 
use the medical literature to promote their products. Without foreclosing that 
explanation, I suggest a different, but also deeply entrenched, contributing cause: 
the rules governing drug approval enacted in 1962. Investigators who put neg-
ative findings into cold storage do no more than the FDA itself in many cases.
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 tasked the FDA with ensuring the 
safety of new drugs before they reach the market. With the revision of the Act in 
1962 in the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments, the FDA was charged with en-
suring the efficacy of new drugs as well. During the pharmaceutical boom of the 
1950s, hundreds of new drugs or combinations poured into the marketplace each 
year, many of doubtful efficacy even though highly advertised to doctors. In what 
now looks like a commercial form of suppressed evidence, such ads often omitted 
side effects and even quoted endorsements of a drug with the original reservations 
left out (Lasagna 1962; McFadyen 1973). In an effort to check misleading adver-
tising as well as exorbitant prices and other abuses, Sen. Estes Kefauver launched 
hearings into the drug industry in December 1959 (Greene and Podolsky 2012). 
However, not until 1962, when news of the thalidomide catastrophe broke, was 
congressional action assured. As the world learned of pregnant women who took 
thalidomide for morning sickness only to give birth to severely deformed infants, 
reform that once seemed unlikely became inevitable.
Compared with such red-hot issues as price and patent reform and with such 
an anguishing crisis as the thalidomide disaster, the question of drug efficacy 
might seem academic. Nevertheless, it commanded legislative and executive at-
tention. In testimony before a House committee on June 20, 1962—just weeks 
before thalidomide became a household word—Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (parent of the FDA), and 
George Larrick, FDA Commissioner, both maintained that drugs should be prov-
en effective before being cleared for the market. What degree or proportion of 
evidence is required to meet this burden of proof? Presumably most of the evi-
dence. The Kennedy administration accordingly drafted a bill with a key clause 
calling for approval of new drugs if and only if their efficacy and safety were 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, the customary administra-
tive-law standard (Carpenter 2010). This reasonable provision was not to the 
liking of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers Association (PMA), however, and in the course of the bargaining that 
fashioned a bill soon adopted unanimously by both houses of Congress, the pre-
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ponderance standard gave way to “substantial evidence” in the form of “adequate 
and well-controlled investigations.”1 Lost in the glare of the latter phrase, which 
has come to be read as a kind of authority for the randomized clinical trial (RCT) 
and as the writ of the FDA as the trial’s regulator, is the low level of evidence 
needed to show efficacy.
Politically speaking, the abandonment of the preponderance standard by the 
Kennedy administration was less dramatic than it seems, as the administration was 
cautious in its enthusiasm for drug reform, preferring to lead from behind and 
keeping its distance from Kefauver throughout his hearings. Practically speaking, 
the loss of preponderance left a void that the category of “substantial evidence” 
could not fill. Note that in the context of the Drug Amendments, “preponder-
ance of evidence” and “substantial evidence” are not even parallel terms, the 
former referring to a proportion of evidence, the latter to the method by which 
evidence is gathered (“adequate and well-controlled investigations”). How much 
evidence constitutes “substantial evidence”? According to one present at the cre-
ation of the Drug Amendments, the term means “more than a scintilla of evi-
dence but not necessarily a preponderance” (Lasagna 1989).2 Even if those who 
originally argued for “substantial evidence” wouldn’t really have placed it at the 
low end of this expansive scale, clearly a world of difference separates the two 
standards.
Two Standards
In sending the Drug Industry Act of 1962 to the floor of the Senate on August 
21, 1962, Sen. James Eastland, chair of the Judiciary Committee, reported that 
“in the course of committee deliberations a distinction evolved . . . between two 
tests—the ‘preponderant evidence’ test and the ‘substantial evidence’ test,” and 
that the committee adopted the second. Congress would follow suit. However, 
in rejecting preponderance in favor of “substantial evidence,” the various framers 
of the Drug Amendments replaced an appropriate measure of evidence with a 
term that doesn’t really measure anything. Possibly just because of the insub-
stantiality of “substantial evidence,” the FDA has focused instead on the word 
investigations, which it interprets to mean more than one investigation.3 Not the 
1The statute language reads, “As used in this section and subsection, the term ‘substantial evidence’ 
means evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investiga-
tions, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug 
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and reasonably be concluded by such experts that the 
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”
2Lasagna paraphrased the courts. See Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F. 2d 640, Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 
(1966): “Substantial evidence . . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be some-
what less than a preponderance.”
3Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F. 2d 147 (1986). Under the 1997 revision of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, the FDA was authorized to accept the findings of one positive trial under certain 
circumstances. See Anello and Junod 2013; Kesselheim and Darrow 2015.
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important-looking word substantial but the letter S sets the level of evidence for 
drug approval. Operationally, “substantial evidence” translates into the positive 
findings of the minimum plural number of well-conducted trials—two—regard-
less of evidence to the contrary. Whereas a preponderance standard “would have 
required a majority of a company’s studies to have demonstrated positive results” 
(Carpenter 2010, 258), an FDA-approved drug may or may not have a majority 
of positive trials under the two-trials requirement. While this requirement has 
been acclaimed as “revolutionary” (Anello and Junod 2013), revolutions rewrite 
memory, and the price at which the two-trials principle was purchased should 
not be forgotten.
Far from being demanding, “substantial evidence of efficacy” represents a 
comparatively weak standard—weak enough, in any case, for Pres. Kennedy to 
have objected in a letter to Sen. Eastland on August 3, 1962, that “this standard 
of proof is inadequate in terms of assuring that drugs that reach the market have 
been shown to be effective for the claims made for them.” The key word, sub-
stantial, is a term of recognized laxity. As noted by the Court of Appeals, 4th 
Circuit, Congress “specifically discarded” the standard of preponderant evidence 
“for the milder term ‘substantial.’”4 Indeed, the courts regard “substantial evi-
dence” as the lowest evidentiary standard (Darrow 2013), a status that makes its 
substitution for preponderance the equivalent of a vertical drop. The relative per-
missiveness of “substantial evidence” no doubt eased the passage of a law which, 
not long before, faced the determined opposition of the pharmaceutical industry 
and the AMA combined. And the effects of the lower standard continue to be 
felt. Recently an FDA official mused aloud on the possibility of a drug with two 
positive studies “out of 14 or 12,” a result that could well occur by chance alone 
(Firth 2015). While that would be an unusual case, the efficacy language now 
in force silently implies the possibility of negative trials, much as the published 
medical literature silently implies an unpublished one. Though “companies can-
not ‘cherry-pick’ the two best trials to submit to the FDA while withholding the 
others from its consideration” (Darrow 2013, 2095), such consideration may well 
result in the archiving of the unsuccessful trials, not the disapproval of the drug. 
How ironic that the two-trials rule, established on the basis of an inoperative 
adjective and a plural noun, acquired the same nickname as the institution of the 
RCT itself: the “gold standard” (Kulynych 1999).
Aside from their difference in clarity and rigor, the preponderance criterion 
takes failures into account while “substantial evidence” does not. Under the for-
mer, if there are too many failures, the drug lacks efficacy. Before the preponder-
ance standard was bargained away, one of its adherents wanted to make sure that 
“if a hundred doctors tested [a] drug and only twenty considered it effective,” 
the drug would be found ineffective (Harris 1964, 204). (One wonders what the 
tests consist of, though.) Even in less one-sided cases, the balance of the evidence 
4Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Inc. v. Richardson, 461 F.2d 215 (1972).
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necessarily matters under a preponderance standard. The “substantial evidence” 
standard as put into practice writes off negative trials provided only that two tri-
als show positive outcomes.5 With the second such trial, it seems, a threshold is 
crossed and a result enters the prestigious category of a reproduced finding.
Originally it took nine trials of paroxetine to yield two positives (Fava et al. 
2003). Under an efficacy standard that accepts a showing like this as substantial 
evidence in favor of the test drug, the negative data often ends up archived be-
cause it has no bearing on the approval of the drug. We have reason to believe, 
then, that an official standard of evaluation that renders negative trials moot has 
something to do with their relative exclusion from the medical literature. Some 
might say that burial in the files of a regulatory agency, or simply an office draw-
er, is a fitting fate for data that lacks evidentiary import and does not factor into 
official judgments of efficacy. That Congress foresaw such a loss of data even as it 
reacted to the thalidomide crisis seems improbable.
A Low Bar
Given that Kefauver himself, the Drug Amendments’ prime mover, had taken 
the position that a drug should show substantial evidence of efficacy, that stan-
dard was only too available as a fallback position when the time came to enact 
a law.6 And yet as legislative matters heated up in June 1962, Kefauver objected 
to a proposal by two members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to replace 
the requirement that a patentable drug show “greater therapeutic effect” with 
the requirement that it offer only a “substantial” improvement: “This wording 
seemed imprecise to Kefauver, and he was insistent that the original wording be 
preserved. . . . To Kefauver the point was crucial” (Harris 1964, 162). On the 
also crucial matter of drug efficacy—crucial enough to shape the official standard 
of drug evaluation from 1962 to this moment—the same imprecision prevailed. It 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that Congress adopted the “substantial evidence” 
standard precisely because of its laxity.
The creation of a system of drug approval leaving broad scope for mixed re-
sults appears to have been entirely deliberate. As an FDA historian has written,
The legal language employed in the [Drug Amendments of 1962], which laid 
out the criteria that would be used in assessing efficacy in support of a new drug 
approval, was not particularly stringent. The law required that there be “sub-
stantial evidence” that the drug “will have the effect it purports or is represented 
to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested 
in the proposed labeling.” Lawyers have concluded that Congress could have 
5On the FDA’s discretionary waiver of the two-trials requirement, see Kulynych 1999.
6In a colloquy on drug efficacy in a hearing of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Decem-
ber 7–9, 1961, Kefauver said, “Substantial evidence is required in most Government procedures, and 
that is inherent in what we have in mind with the bills.”
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established a more stringent drug approval process simply by using stronger 
legal terminology. The fact that terms such as “preponderance of evidence” or 
“evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” were not used indicates that Congress 
did not intend to set the bar for efficacious new drug approvals too high. New 
drugs did not have to be superior to other drugs on the market nor did “sub-
stantial evidence” mean evidence “so strong as to convince everyone.” (Junod 
2008)
Tellingly, no characterization of “substantial evidence” is offered except to say 
that it’s weaker than a preponderance and doesn’t necessarily win everyone over. 
As strangely vacant as the concept is, that is how the framers of the Drug Amend-
ments understood it. In hearings on what became the Amendments, critics ar-
gued for an efficacy criterion whose operative definition was simply that it was 
not a preponderance of evidence. The following exchange in a hearing of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce is characteristic:
Mr. DINGELL. All right. Do you think that the efficacy should be supported 
just by substantial evidence or should it be supported by the preponderance of 
evidence?
Dr. KEEFER. I think it should be supported by substantial evidence. 
To its opponents, the preponderance standard was at once dictatorial and ar-
tificial. Such a delicate question as the efficacy of a drug is not to be decided by 
the tyranny of averages or the edicts of regulators and is best left to time and 
the free play of informed opinion. Indeed, critics one after another rejected the 
proposition that premarket trials alone can determine the efficacy of a drug. In 
the submitted opinion of the AMA, because “a drug’s efficacy varies from patient 
to patient,” only the prescribing physician can judge a drug’s worth for any given 
patient. (This position appears to clash with one taken by the AMA a few years 
before, namely that “the average physician has neither the time nor the facilities 
to experiment with new drugs in order to determine their proper indications for 
use” [Wardell and Lasagna 1975, 14].) The true measure of a drug makes itself 
known not in a handful of clinical trials but in “the extensive use of the drug 
by large numbers of the medical profession over a long period of time.” It was 
because such practical studies (if that is the word) could be expected to yield 
conflicting findings that many opposed a standard of efficacy that seemed to them 
unreasonably rigid. And if the rejection of preponderance opens the possibility of 
approval of a drug found effective only in a minority of studies, the framers did 
not shrink from this implication. Thus, in a 1962 report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee we read:
The term “substantial evidence” is used to require that therapeutic claims for 
new drugs be supported by reliable pharmacological and clinical studies. When 
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a drug has been adequately tested by qualified experts and has been found to 
have the effect claimed for it, this claim should be permitted even though there 
may be preponderant evidence to the contrary based upon equally reliable studies.
To many who rejected the preponderance standard in favor of the looser crite-
rion of “substantial evidence,” it seems a trial or study was something conducted 
by the doctor in his office, without randomization, controls, or other procedural 
niceties. (Thalidomide itself had been given to American patients by their doctor 
as an “investigational” drug, as if handing out samples constituted a trial.) In the 
course of the Kefauver hearings, some witnesses complained of the evidentiary 
worthlessness of this sort of exercise. “I gave drug ‘x’ to patients 1 through 10, 
and they all did quite nicely on it” (Anello and Junod 2013, 2). The tradition of 
case studies survived the onslaught of the Kefauver hearings and the revision of 
FDA rules, and two decades later an acute sociologist renewed the criticisms of 
the genre. He also pointed out that such studies exhibit the telltale signs of pub-
lication bias: “Medical journals, along with those in other fields, tend to publish 
only reports of ‘successful’ interventions. One seldom reads of unsuccessful in-
terventions, even though their frequency may be equal to, and probably greater 
than, those purported to be successful” (McKinlay 1981, 379). While RCTs 
represent an evidentiary advance over case studies, the abandonment of the pre-
ponderance standard in the course of the Drug Amendments’ evolution into law 
invited a similar outcome. If a drug meets the two-trial requirement, negative 
trials are academic, after all; they become footnotes to history.
Over the course of the Kefauver hearings it emerged that pharmaceutical com-
panies had much information about their drugs that was never disclosed to the 
FDA (Goodrich 1963). Over the decades to come, the FDA itself would amass 
trial data that was not disclosed to the public. Certainly this did not happen by 
Congressional design. Though the authors of the Drug Amendments evidently 
knew they were leaving latitude for unsuccessful trials, they did not realize that 
by depriving them of evidentiary significance they were creating the conditions 
for their burial.
The Challenge of the Placebo Effect
Opposition to the preponderance standard in 1962 seems to have arisen in part 
from a misunderstanding of that concept. Alleging that “if a drug company 
should be required to submit a preponderance of evidence as to the effectiveness 
of a new drug, it is highly doubtful that any drug which is effective in treating 
a limited percentage of patients would ever be marketed,” critics argued that a 
drug shown to help 20% of patients with epilepsy would be disallowed because it 
failed to benefit the other 80%. In the world as we know it, a drug doesn’t have 
to help a preponderance of patients in order to be found effective: “Countless 
drugs that have been shown in randomised controlled trials to be effective work 
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in only a minority of patients” (Christakis 2008, 1025). The question before 
most trials is not whether a drug helps more patients than not but whether it 
helps more patients than placebo; and if enough so benefit, the trial succeeds 
(provided of course that the drug doesn’t do more harm than good). Not that 
success comes easily. While some hold that “better than placebo” simply means 
“better than nothing” (Avorn 2005, 970)—which would be the lowest standard 
imaginable—the power of the placebo has undone many a drug in preliminary 
testing and poses a nemesis for the companies that make them (Potter, Mallinck-
rodt, and Detke 2014). A recent review of published trials of drugs for neuro-
pathic pain, for example, found a rising placebo response (linked to longer trials 
offering “richer social support”) and a correlative dwindling of the drug-placebo 
difference (Tuttle et al. 2015). How confounding the placebo effect must be if 
“a dose of enthusiastic iatrotherapy [that is, comfort and reassurance] given in 
conjunction with an ineffectual drug will usually make patients feel much better 
than a moderately effective drug delivered with little or no iatrotherapy” (Fein-
stein 1971, 552). Inasmuch as trials that fail to establish the superiority of drug to 
placebo often fail to appear in the medical literature, the power of the placebo is 
highly implicated in the problem of publication bias.
The placebo effect bedevils in particular trials of psychoactive drugs, and for 
this reason “when a pharmaceutical company seeks FDA approval for a new 
drug treatment for psychiatric disorders, it is quite common for the NDA [New 
Drug Application] submission to be filled with trials where superiority over pla-
cebo was not demonstrated” (Fava et al. 2003, 116). That the published litera-
ture is filled with trials where superiority over placebo is demonstrated implies 
that much trial data has disappeared from public view. Perhaps the best-known 
excavation of data interred in the files of the FDA was the disclosure by Irving 
Kirsch in 2010 that more than half of trials of antidepressants reported to the FDA 
found no superiority of drug to placebo. As newsworthy as Kirsch’s report was, 
the uneven showing of antidepressants was already a matter of record. In 2001 a 
meta-analysis of published and unpublished trials of tricyclic antidepressants 
against placebo found that the drugs failed to outperform placebo in 22 of 32 
studies (Storosum et al. 2001): a preponderance of negative evidence. In 2002, a 
review of 15 years of data obtained from the FDA under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act found that antidepressants tested superior to placebo in 48% of trials 
(Khan, Khan, and Brown 2002). A 2008 review of published and unpublished 
studies of 12 antidepressants involving over 12,000 patients found that among 
those studies registered with the FDA, “whether and how the studies were pub-
lished were associated with the study outcome,” with the published literature 
suggesting that virtually all trials were positive, but FDA reviews showing a pos-
itive rate of 51% (Turner et al. 2008, 252).
The better to track the implications of decisions about standards of evidence 
made half a century ago, I have confined discussion to the question of efficacy, 
The Weight of a Term
209spring 2018 • volume 61, number 2
putting safety to one side. Yet judgments of efficacy and harm intertwine, as in a 
recent notorious case of suppressed findings brought to light. A reanalysis of the 
data from SmithKline Beecham’s Study 329, some of it contained in 77,000 pages 
of previously unpublished documents, revealed not only that paroxetine failed to 
outperform placebo, but that it increased the risk of “suicidal ideation and be-
haviour” in the study’s adolescent subjects (Le Noury et al. 2015). (A review in 
The Lancet in 2005 concluded that more than half of all studies of antidepressants 
in children and adolescents failed to show superiority to placebo, with much data 
from negative trials “available only as posters from scientific meetings or . . . not 
yet available” [Ryan 2005, 938].) Given that paroxetine failed to outperform 
placebo in seven of nine trials in its original New Drug Application (as noted 
above), the negative finding of Study 329 is not in itself shocking, although it 
would seem to strain medical calculation to raise the risk of a suicide attempt in 
order to obtain the benefits of a placebo.  
Paroxetine is also among the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
tested as a treatment for PTSD, with mixed results. An interesting report of an 
unsuccessful trial of the kindred drug fluoxetine for PTSD found that the placebo 
response rate ran “substantially higher than in a previously published fluoxetine 
trial of posttraumatic stress disorder” [sic]. The authors also note that in recent 
years several studies of SSRIs for PTSD “have been published with ambiguous 
results, negative or failed trials, and some studies with negative results remain un-
published” (Martenyi, Brow, and Caldwell 2007). As in the case of other studies 
of placebo-responsive conditions, the impression is of a continuum running from 
successful trials to equivocal ones to failures, with publication at one end and 
nonpublication at the other.
Fluoxetine in turn has also been studied as a treatment for premenstrual dys-
phoric disorder (PMDD). In the file reviewed by the FDA prior to the approval 
of fluoxetine (Sarafem) as a treatment for PMDD were (1) one trial in which the 
daily record of severity of problems declined 8% more for subjects on 20 mg of 
drug than on placebo; (2) one trial in which 2% more patients showed marked 
improvement on 20 mg of drug than on placebo; and (3) one trial in which 20 
mg fluoxetine wasn’t superior to placebo at all. (On the label from which I have 
taken this information, the FDA recommends a 20 mg dosage of Sarafem.) The 
latter trial is summarized by the FDA as follows:
In another continuous dosing, double-blind parallel group study, patients with 
LLPDD [late luteal phase dysphoric disorder] (N=42) were treated daily with 
fluoxetine 20mg/day, bupropion 300mg/day, or placebo for 2 months. Neither 
fluoxetine nor bupropion was shown to be superior to placebo on the primary 
endpoint, i.e., response rate (defined as a rating of 1 [very much improved] or 2 
[much improved]), possibly due to sample size.7
7See http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2009/021860s005lbl.pdf.
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Unlike the accompanying summaries of the positive trials (one of which involved 
19 subjects), this skeletal précis gives no statistical breakdown. One suspects the 
study in question lies unpublished.
Similarly, in trials of the weight-loss drug Contrave (naltrexone and bupro-
pion), subjects shed 4%, 3%, and 2% more weight with the drug than placebo, 
though treatment also included behavioral counseling, with those undergoing the 
most intensive counseling showing the best results.8 The drug label mentions the 
COR-II trial but, in contrast to the three nominally positive studies, does not 
report its results. Presumably this is another case where a high placebo response 
not only overwhelmed the drug but entombed the trial’s findings.
Let a final example of archived evidence serve for many. A 1999 review of 
trials of treatments of irritable bowel syndrome (a condition known to be recep-
tive to the placebo effect) observes that “most therapies have so far been only 
marginally better than placebo” and that “many studies in the literature used far 
too few patients to show an effect unless this was extremely large.” Given these 
shortcomings, the author concludes that a number of positive findings “were the 
result of chance or else many negative studies were never published.” Here too, 
nonpublication of trial findings seems to be associated with a placebo effect high 
enough to rival the effect of a drug (Spiller 1999; see also Darrow 2013). Once 
again we may note that a treatment tenuously superior to placebo may or may 
not accrue a preponderance of positive trials even though it meets the criteria for 
approval.
At the time of the Drug Amendments of 1962, an important line of argu-
ment, advanced notably by Henry Beecher in his seminal paper “The Powerful 
Placebo” (1955), held that nothing but rigorous trials could determine whether a 
drug was more effective than placebo. While Beecher emphasized the necessity 
of randomization, double-blinding, and statistical validation, as well as the use of 
placebos in what came to be called “well-controlled investigations,” he silently 
assumed another element of the trial regime: the due reporting of findings. If, 
as he says, “Many a drug has been extolled on the basis of clinical impression 
when the only power it had was that of a placebo,” how could such an error be 
corrected unless the outcome of trials showing the drug’s efficacy as tantamount 
to placebo were reported to the world? Concealment of unsuccessful trials can 
also mask the inefficacy of a drug that may be superior to placebo, but not im-
pressively so. Ondansetron has been widely used as anti-emetic even though a 
systematic review concluded that it “does not prevent PONV [post-operative 
nausea and vomiting] very well,” adding that “any publication bias would be ex-
pected to show that that ondansetron prophylaxis works even less well” (Tramer 
et al. 1997).
In the same year as the Drug Amendments, Beecher’s sometime-collaborator 
Louis Lasagna (1962) defended the importance of experiments that prove un-
8See http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2014/200063s000lbl.pdf.
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successful. After all, if we know the outcome of a study beforehand, why run 
it? Two decades later the point had still not sunk in, and a proponent of evi-
dence-based medicine contended that the term “negative trial” constitutes a kind 
of prejudicial misnomer, blocking the recognition that “all trials that have been 
well conceived and well conducted—whatever their results—represent positive 
contributions to knowledge” (Chalmers 1985, 1002). So loaded with misleading 
connotations of failure was the expression “negative trial” that the author pro-
posed in the spirit of Swift to ban it. Is it too much to suppose that a regulatory 
standard that rewards positive findings and moots negative ones has helped make 
this term prejudicial?
Disregarded Data
At a critical moment in the summer of 1962, John Blair, Sen. Kefauver’s chief 
economist, and Lloyd Cutler, a lawyer representing opponents of drug reform, 
suddenly found themselves agreeing that only substantial—not preponderant—
evidence should be required to show the efficacy of new drugs. What moved 
Blair to abandon the preponderance standard was his belief that when opinions 
differ, the possibility that truth might reside with the minority must be kept open. 
In reply to the argument that if a hundred doctors evaluate a drug the opinion of 
20 should not prevail, “Blair said that since, generally speaking, any innovation 
was apt to meet with opposition, he was willing to accept ‘substantial’ evidence” 
(Harris 1964, 204). It seems Blair, in the tradition of John Stuart Mill, was wary 
of establishing a tyranny of the majority that would crush the dissenting views 
on which progress depends. Cutler, representing a former medical director of the 
FDA, argued before a House committee that same summer that a drug should 
be considered effective provided only that responsible clinicians deem it so, even 
when “a numerical majority or a preponderance of evidence, or whatever else 
you might call it” points to the opposite conclusion. Somehow the seemingly 
abstract issue of standards of evidence became tangled up with emotional top-
ics like minority rights and the persecution of dissenting views. Cutler’s client 
spoke powerfully of the evils of orthodoxy and the vital importance of conflicts 
of opinion, invoking great medical reformers like Semmelweis (Mill’s contem-
porary) in opposition to what he considered the authoritarian strain in proposals 
for drug reform. But regardless of our cherished stories of lone dissenters braving 
opposition, it’s a strange thought that the preponderance standard fell victim to 
anti-majoritarian sentiment, just as it would be melodramatic to portray FDA 
approval of certain New Drug Applications with only 14% positive trials (Fava et 
al. 2003) as a victory of truth over persecution.
As the story goes, it was Blair who turned compromise into triumph by insert-
ing the all-important reference to clinical trials into the Drug Amendments. In 
return for scrapping the preponderance standard he “insisted that the amendment 
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stipulate that the evidence consist of ‘adequate and well-controlled investigations, 
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and ex-
perience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.’” The deal was done, 
and when an ally of Kefauver’s learned of it, he rejoiced. “I just couldn’t believe 
it when Blair pulled that off,” he said. “It gives us all kinds of power—especial-
ly the word ‘adequate’—to make sure that drugs do what is claimed for them” 
(Harris 1964, 204–5).
Over the decades since 1962, the FDA has taken the words “adequate and 
well-controlled investigations” to heart like a motto. An agency endowed with 
“all kinds of power” by a phrase has become the most redoubtable regulatory 
body in the world. At this point, however, a curious anomaly appears. While 
the FDA, empowered by language giving it oversight of clinical investigations 
of new drugs, has often wielded its regulatory authority with a strong hand, the 
evidence generated by such investigations is evaluated under a standard designed 
to be weak, a standard whose very description tends to be watery: “evidence that 
doesn’t necessarily convince everyone.” Perhaps giving power with one hand and 
taking it away with the other was somebody’s idea of checks and balances. But 
if competent investigators produce mixed data as they go about testing whether 
drugs in fact do what they are represented to do, what becomes of the evidence 
that tells against efficacy but doesn’t stand in the way of a drug’s approval, given 
that the evidence in support of efficacy need only be “substantial”?
When Kirsch (2010) petitioned the FDA under the Freedom of Information 
Act for its unpublished records of antidepressant trials, he discovered an internal 
memo contending that the disclosure of such data was “of no practical value ei-
ther to the patient or the prescriber” (49). It’s not hard to see why many might 
take such a dismissive view of data that looks like a mere by-product or even 
waste product of the process of drug approval. Overruled by positive findings, 
the reports of negative trials are filed away—consigned to Lethe. The view that 
negative findings lack value and therefore do not warrant publication is not, of 
course, confined to internal FDA discussions. While a recent meta-analysis of an-
tipsychotic clinical trials reaching back to 1960 found that the test drug did better 
than placebo in only 15 of 39 studies, even this figure may be inflated “because 
RCTs failing to demonstrate significant differences between medication and pla-
cebo may not have been published” (Rutherford et al. 2014, 1418).
With the market overrun with drugs of unverified efficacy at the time of the 
1962 Amendments, the need for an appropriate standard of evidence—prepon-
derance—cried aloud. Congress did not heed it. Perhaps fearing that a standard 
too robust would empty the shelves of the local pharmacy, it “did not intend to 
set the bar for efficacious new drug approvals too high” (Junod 2008) and there-
fore imposed a criterion whose only ascertainable meaning is that it is not partic-
ularly demanding. If the 1962 Drug Amendments had required a preponderance 
of evidence from “adequate and well-controlled investigations,” the process of 
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drug evaluation at all levels would have to reckon with contrary evidence more 
fully and openly than is now the case. Two positive trials would not cancel any 
number of negative trials, and because negative findings would retain their signif-
icance, the argument against their disclosure would lose its foundation. Published 
literature would not resemble a 1950s medical ad containing strategic omissions. 
In 1962, however, the suppression of something close to a preponderance of all 
investigational findings may have been unimaginable.
References
Anello, C., and S. Junod. 2013. “Contributions of Robert T. O’Neill to the Evolution of 
Regulatory Statistical Science.” Stat Biopharm Res 5: 1–18.
Avorn, J. 2005. “FDA Standards: Good Enough for Government Work?” NEJM 353 
(2005): 969–72.
Beecher, H. 1955. “The Powerful Placebo.” JAMA 159: 1602–6.
Carpenter, D. 2010. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regula-
tion at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chalmers, I. 1985. “Proposal to Outlaw the Term ‘Negative Trial.’” BMJ 290: 1002.
Christakis, N. 2008. “Does This Work for You?” BMJ 337: 1025.
Darrow, J. 2013. “Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal Standard.” Washington Lee 
Law Rev 70: 2073–2136.
Fava, M., et al. 2003. “The Problem of the Placebo Response in Clinical Trials for 
Psychiatric Disorders: Culprits, Possible Remedies, and a Novel Study Design Ap-
proach.” Psychother Psychosom 72: 115–27.
Feinstein, A. 1971. “How Do We Measure ‘Safety’ and ‘Efficacy’?” Clin Pharmacol Ther 
12: 544–58.
Firth, S. 2015. “FDA Advisory Panel Unmoved by Gepirone Data.” MedPage Today, 
Dec. 3.
Goodrich, W. 1963. “A Look into the Nooks and Corners of the Kefauver-Harris Drug 
Amendments of 1962.” Business Lawyer 19: 187–92.
Greene, J., and S. Podolsky. 2012. “Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals: The Ke-
fauver-Harris Amendments at 50.” N Engl J Med 367: 1481–83.
Harris, R. 1964. The Real Voice. New York: Macmillan.
Ioannidis, J. 2017. “Does Evidence-Based Hearsay Determine the Use of Medical Treat-
ments?” Soc Sci Med 177: 256–58.
Junod, S. W. 2008. “FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History.” http://www.fda.
gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm/.
Kesselheim, A., and J. Darrow. 2015. “FDA Designations for Therapeutics and Their 
Impact on Drug Development and Regulatory Review Outcomes.” Clin Pharmacol 
Ther 97: 29–36.
Khan, A., S. Khan, and W. Brown. 2002. “Are Placebo Controls Necessary to Test An-
tidepressants and Anxiolytics?” Int J Neuropsychopharmacol 5: 193–97.
Kirsch, I. 2010. The Emperor’s New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant Myth. New York: 
Basic Books.
Stewart Justman
214 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
Kulynych, J. 1999. “Will FDA Relinquish the ‘Gold Standard’ for New Drug Approval? 
Redefining ‘Substantial Evidence’ in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997.” Food Drug 
Law J 54: 127–49.
Lasagna, L. 1962. The Doctors’ Dilemmas. New York: Harper.
Lasagna, L. 1989. “Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 
1962.” Perspect Biol Med 32: 322–43.
Le Noury, J., et al. 2015. “Restoring Study 329: Efficacy and Harms of Paroxetine and 
Imipramine in Treatment of Major Depression in Adolescence.” BMJ 351: h4320.
Martenyi, F., E. Brow, and C. Caldwell. 2007. “Failed Efficacy of Fluoxetine in the 
Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” J Clin Psychopharmacol 27: 166–70.
McFadyen, R. 1973. “Estes Kefauver and the Drug Industry.” PhD diss., Emory Uni-
versity.
McKinlay, J. 1981. “From ‘Promising Report’ to ‘Standard Procedure’: The Seven Stages 
in the Career of a Medical Innovation.” Milbank Q 59: 374–411.
Potter, W., C. Mallinckrodt, and M. Detke. 2014. “Controlling Placebo Response in 
Drug Development: Lessons Learned from Psychopharmacology.” Pharm Med 28: 
53–65.
Rutherford, B., et al. 2014. “Placebo Response in Antipsychotic Clinical Trials: A 
Meta-Analysis.” JAMA Psychiatry 71: 1409–21.
Ryan, N. 2005. “Treatment of Depression in Children and Adolescents.” Lancet 366: 
933–40.
Simes, R. 1986. “Publication Bias: The Case for an International Registry of Clinical 
Trials.” J Clin Oncology 4: 1529–41.
Spiller, R. 1999. “Problems and Challenges in the Design of Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
Clinical Trials: Experience from Published Trials.” Am J Med 107: 91s–97s.
Storosum, J., et al. 2001. “Short-Term Efficacy of Tricyclic Antidepressants Revisited: A 
Meta-Analytic Study.” Eur Neuropsychopharmacol 11: 173–80.
Tramer, M., et al. 1997. “Efficacy, Dose-Response, and Safety of Ondansetron in Pre-
vention of Postoperative Nausea and Vomiting: A Quantitative Systematic Review of 
Randomized Placebo-Controlled Trials.” Anesthesiology 87: 1277–89.
Turner, E., et al. 2008. “Selective Publication of Antidepressants Trials and Its Influence 
on Apparent Efficacy.” N Engl J Med 358: 252–60.
Tuttle, A., et al. 2015. “Increasing Placebo Responses over Time in U.S. Clinical Trials 
of Neuropathic Pain.” Pain 156: 2616–26.
Wardell, W., and L. Lasagna. 1975. Regulation and Drug Development. Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute.
